In the context of
a criminal trial of supporters of allegedly terrorist organization in Somalia,
Eighth Circuit considers whether the Secretary of State’s designation of a
foreign organization as a “terrorist organization” violates due process
Amina Farah Ali and Hawo Mohamed Hassan, both from Somalia, are United States naturalized citizens living in Minnesota. In February 2008, the Secretary of State designated al Shabaab as a foreign terrorist organization. That same year, the FBI learned that Ali had contacted members of al Shabaab. Both Ali and Hassan were criminally charged.
During the ten-day trial in 2011, the jury learned about the history of Somalia and the goal of al Shabaab “to impose [its] version of Islamic law on Somalia”, as explained by the expert witness, Matthew Bryden.
The Government presented evidence that Ali and Hassan planned and participated in fundraising teleconferences in which a speaker would give a lecture; that Hassan kept track of the donors’ phone numbers; that Ali spoke with Hassan Afgoye, who at one time was responsible for al Shabaab’s finances, and discussed money that she arranged to be sent to him or to his associates; that Ali also spoke with Agoye about the activities of al Shabaab in Somalia, and was happy to learn that enemies were killed; and that Hassan spoke with members of al Shabaab and he was happy to hear about the killings carried out by this group. Furthermore, the Government presented evidence of Ali’s and Hassan’s connection with groups both inside and outside of Somalia, and with terrorists such as Hassan Dahir Aweys, and demonstrated that al Shabaab had connections to al Qaeda. The Government further presented evidence related to two false-statement counts against Hassan which were related to statements made in 2009 to an FBI agent that Ali did not know anyone who sent money to al Shabaab and similar groups; nor that Ali had ever asked that money be sent to Somalia or elsewhere through a “hawala” (an informal value transfer system based on the performance and honor of a network of money brokers).
In
their closing arguments, Ali and Hassan defended their actions as an intention
to provide humanitarian relief to Somalia. The jury returned a guilty verdict
on all counts. The district court sentenced Ali to 240 months in prison and
Hassan to 120 months in prison. Both Ali and Hassan appealed.
The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirms the district
court’s decision.
In
a de novo review, the Court decides the issue raised by Ali and Hassan on
whether the designation of a foreign organization as a terrorist organization
by the Secretary of State violates their due process.
First,
Ali and Hassan claimed that their material-support convictions violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
“As
relevant here, the material-support statute forbids ‘knowingly provid[ing]
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempt[ing] or conspir[ing] to do so.’ 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The phrase
‘foreign terrorist organization’ is a term of art that is defined in 8 U.S.C. §
1189(a)(1). Under this provision, the Secretary of State may designate an
organization a foreign terrorist organization if the Secretary finds that (1)
the organization is a ‘foreign organization’; (2) the organization engages in
‘terrorist activity’ or ‘terrorism’ or ‘retains the capability and intent to
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism’; and (3) ‘the terrorist activity or
terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals
or the national security of the United States.’ Id. Section 1189 also provides
a mechanism by which an organization can seek judicial review of its
designation as a foreign terrorist organization in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. § 1189(c)(1). However, this
ability to challenge a designation belongs to the organization, not a defendant
in a criminal proceeding. Id. § 1189(a)(8).”
Second,
Ali and Hassan argued that prohibiting them from challenging the Secretary of
State’s designation of al Shabaab as a foreign terrorist organization also
offends due process.
“[…]For
purposes of the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has stated that ‘in
determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the . . .
legislature’s definition of the elements of the offense is usually
dispositive.’ McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986). Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B, ‘Congress has provided that the fact of an organization’s designation
as [a foreign terrorist organization] is an element of [the crime], but the
validity of the designation is not.’ Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 331. Thus, like our
sister circuits, we hold that it comports with due process to prohibit a
criminal defendant from challenging the validity of the Secretary of State’s
designation of a foreign terrorist organization. See id.; Afshari, 426 F.3d at
1155-59. In reaching this conclusion, we note that an organization’s designation
as a foreign terrorist organization is not wholly immune from challenge. The
statute provides a method by which an organization, rather than a criminal
defendant, can contest the Secretary of State’s designation. 8 U.S.C. §
1189(c); see Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65-67 (1980).”
The
Court also rejects Ali’s and Hassan’s argument that allowing the Secretary of
State to designate foreign terrorist organizations amounts to an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
“The
longstanding rule is that ‘Congress may delegate its legislative power if it
`lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person
or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’ South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t
of Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original)
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928)). Congress has ‘wide latitude in meeting the intelligible principle
requirement . . . [because] `Congress simply cannot do its job absent an
ability to delegate power under broad general directives.’ Id. (quoting
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). ‘Congress fails to give
sufficient guidance in its delegations only if it `would be impossible in a
proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.’
Id. at 796 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944)).”
“The
statutory scheme governing the designation of foreign terrorist organizations
provides an intelligible principle. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205
F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that § 1189(a) ‘does not grant the
Secretary unfettered discretion in designating the groups to which giving
material support is prohibited). […]As the Ninth Circuit has observed, ‘[t]he
Secretary could not, under this standard, designate the International Red Cross
or the International Olympic Committee as [foreign] terrorist organizations.
Rather, the Secretary must have reasonable grounds to believe that an
organization has engaged in terrorist acts—assassinations, bombings,
hostage-taking and the like—before she can place it on the list.” Humanitarian
Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1137.[…]”
Ali
and Hassan also argued against the requirement that the Secretary of State
determines that an organization “threatens the security of United States
nationals or the national security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1189(a)(1)(C). Furthermore, they argued that the term “national security” is
“defined without meanings.”
“[…]
But the statute defines ‘national security’ to mean ‘the national defense,
foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.’ Id. §
1189(d)(2). That this definition is general and broad does not an
unintelligible principle make. See South Dakota, 423 F.3d at 795. Moreover,
‘[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly underscored that the intelligible principle
standard is relaxed for delegations in fields in which the Executive
traditionally has wielded its own power.’ Hepting v. AT&T Corp. (In re
Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig.), 671 F.3d 881, 89798 (9th Cir.
2011) (collecting cases); see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)
(‘Congress—in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign
affairs—must of necessity paint with a brush broader than it customarily wields
in domestic areas.’). For these reasons, we hold that granting the Secretary of
State the ability to designate an organization a foreign terrorist organization
does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.”
The Court affirms district court’s decision.
Citation: US v. Ali, 799
F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2015).
Mayowa F. Odusanya
Areas
Criminal
defense, DUI and DWI, Divorce and separation, Real Estate, White Collar Crime
Contact
KMT
LEGAL, P.A.
401
S Parsons Ave
Brandon,
FL 33511-5292
United
States
Office: 813-397-3678
Fax: 727-499-7108
Education
Mayowa
F. Odusanya's education includes:
Florida
International University, College of Law, Juris Doctor, 2009
Florida
A. & M. University, B.S., 2005.
Former
work experience includes the Miami Dade Public Defender's Office; and the law firm
of Walter, Jones & Brown.
References
